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Abstract
In a world with complete markets and no transactions cost, the decision
whether to rent or buy a home is separate from a household’s professional
income risk. If markets are incomplete and have frictions, however, profession-
specific income risk, regional house price risk, and mobility needs will interact
and should affect the tenure mode choice. Using panel data fromWest Germany,
we establish homogeneous profession groups and estimate their regional net
income risk and regional mobility. We then examine the impact of the risk
and mobility variables on the tenure mode decision at the aggregate and the
individual household level. We find that the diversification potential of renting
affects the tenure mode choice as do mobility needs.
Keywords: Tenure mode choice, background risk, household mobility
JEL Classification: R21, G11, J24, C25
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1 Introduction
Choosing whether to rent or buy a home is a multifaceted and difficult task. House-
holds have to grapple not only with the uncertainties of future housing cost, but
also need to consider how the tenure mode choice matches conditions set by past
decisions. The most important of these conditions is human capital. Early career
decisions, such as the choice of an occupation and an industry, have a sizable and
often irreversible impact on the specificity of human capital (Cunha and Heckman,
2007; Neal, 1995). If other measures to insure against the risk of profession-specific
human capital are imperfect, then the exposure to this risk may affect the decision
of whether to rent or buy.
Early empirical studies on households’ tenure choice focussed on differences in
the relative price and risk of renting and owning. In most developed countries, the
imputed rent from owner-occupation is not taxed and user cost of owning decreases
with the household’s marginal tax rate, which is particulary valuable to households
with high taxable income and should make them more likely to own. A household’s
tenure choice will be further affected by the risk difference of future house and rental
prices. Finally, because a house purchase exposes the owner’s portfolio to a single
source of risk, sufficient wealth is required to hold a well-diversified portfolio.1
More recently, Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2002) argued that the tenure choice
depends not on the risk of house and rental prices per se, but on the correlation
of these prices with household’s income and mobility requirements. First, renting
a home instead of owning it exposes the household to future changes of the rental
price. Owing a home effectively locks housing cost at a fixed level and eliminates
uncertainty over the future rental price. This lock-in effect is more valuable the
1Rosen (1979) and Rosen and Rosen (1980) provide evidence for the impact of user cost on the
tenure choice for the US and King (1980) for the UK. Rosen et al. (1984) considers additionally house
and rental price risk and finds that households’ tenure choice responds to the risk differential between
both. Berkovec and Fullerton (1992) calibrate a general equilibrium model in which homeownership
is encouraged by household’s wealth and the potential of holding a well-diversified portfolio of assets.
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longer a household expects to stay in a region. Sinai and Souleles (2005) provide
empirical evidence on this effect. Second, rental price uncertainty is not necessarily
detrimental if it is positively correlated with the household’s income. In this case,
renting allows the household to diversify some of the net income risk. Consider a
region that is dominated by one industry: If the industry is hit by a negative shock,
the incomes of the those working in the industry will also experience a negative
shock. This will lead to a decrease in demand for housing services and regional
rental prices. Renters benefit from this decrease, while homeowners not only receive
lower income, but also suffer from a decline of their housing wealth. Davidoff (2006)
provides empirical evidence on this diversification effect.2 Third, if a household has
to be mobile, then renting shields the household from house price resale risk and
lowers transactions cost associated with the move. Even if the household expects
to move to a region where house prices are hit by the same shock, making resale
risk less of a concern, transactions cost will be substantial. Lower transactions cost
of moving is a clear advantage for households in professions where the required job
mobility is high. The studies of Haurin and Gill (2002), Henderson and Ioannides
(1989) and Kan (2000) provide evidence on this effect, but do not consider the
interaction with resale price risk.
In this study, we use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to establish
homogeneous profession groups, their mobility needs, and constant-quality profession-
income and regional rental price indices. We then examine if the diversification
potential of renting plays a role for the tenure choice of different profession groups.
Further, we examine if profession-specific mobility needs make renting more likely.
In addition to the analysis at the level of profession-region groups, we also analyse
the tenure choice at the household level. Each household belongs to a professions
2Diaz-Serrano (2005) studies the influence of idiosyncratic—not profession-systematic—income
risk. He finds that greater income uncertainty increases a household’s propensity to rent. He inter-
prets this result as evidence for restrictions in accessing the mortgage market faced by households
exposed to greater idiosyncratic income risk.
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group and is exposed to group’s systematic income risk, but other observed and
unobserved household characteristics may also impact on the tenure choice.
Our approach is similar to Davidoff (2006, Section 4.2.), but extends it by using
household panel data. This allows us to construct homogeneous profession groups
by clustering over industries and occupations; these groups are stable over time
in the sense that intra-group moves are likely, but inter-group moves are unlikely.
Using the household information in the panel, we can compute constant-quality
income indices for the different profession groups and use these to measure the
systematic net income risk.3 Further, we model mobility requirements explicitly
and find this variable to be very important. Exploiting the panel structure, we can
also fit dynamic models of households’ tenure choices, making our analysis robust
with respect to different econometric specifications.
We find at the aggregate profession-region group level that the diversification
potential of renting has a significant influence on rental shares. A decrease of the
diversification potential variable, which relates the net income risk if owning to the
risk if renting, by 10% (thereby increasing diversification potential of renting) in-
creases the share of renters by about 1%. Furthermore, the renters’ share increases
the shorter the expected remaining residence duration is, i.e., the more mobile house-
holds in a profession group have to be. A decrease of the expected duration by one
year increases the probability to rent by about 3%. The results at the individual
household level are very similar and hold even after controlling for the substantial
state dependence of households’ tenure choices and after controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity.
Our study on the German housing market therefore supports evidence found for
the US market. Renting is not just for those who cannot afford to buy a home, but
can provide valuable benefits in the context of a household’s risk management. Seen
3Davidoff’s household data is a cross-section from the 1990 US Census. He measures income
risk using region-industry average incomes and matches with respect to household head’s industry
according to the official SIC classification.
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in this light, there are no reasons why governments should favor one tenure mode
over the other.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical
motivation. Section 3 presents the data and explains the construction of the key
variables. The empirical implementation is explained in Section 4. Section 5 presents
the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. A Supplement, which provides further
details, is available from the authors upon request.
2 Theoretical motivation
Most human capital is acquired early in life and becomes quite specific during the
course of one’s professional career. The future income from this specialized capital
is risky and cannot be fully hedged. If we take it as given that the tenure choice
is made after the human capital has been formed, then the comovement between
income and regional rental prices may allow members of some professions to diversify
part of their systematic income risk through their tenure choice. Moreover, if the
acquired human capital is in a profession that requires mobility, then this may also
impact on this choice.
We expose the tenure choice problem with a discrete time utility maximization
framework.5 Dwellings are homogeneous and are supplied by absent risk neutral
4Owner-occupied housing is favored relative to other investments because income (imputed rent)
is not taxed. Rental housing investments receive favorable treatment too (accelerated depreciation
allowances, financing and modernization subsidies), which should impact on the rental price via
increased supply. The net effect is far from obvious. White and White (1977) calculate for the
US that owner-occupation is favored and that richer owner households benefit. Hubert (1998)
suggests that the private rental sector may have received slightly more favorable treatment in
(West) Germany.
5Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2002) and Davidoff (2006) provide similar expositions.
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agents, who are prepared to act as landlords or to sell the dwellings. Rents follow
Rr,t = R+ "r,t +
t−1∑
k=1
Ák"r,t−k t ⩾ 1 , (1)
where r indicates the region, ∣Á∣ < 1, and "r,t is white noise, possibly contemporane-
ously correlated between the regions. The household makes the decision in period 0
and Rr,0 = R in all regions. The required return rate for a housing investment is i
and the house price is P = R/i in period 0. A household’s professional career lasts
T periods; a profession-related move might be necessary in 1 < t′ ⩽ T .
Expected utility is additive time-separable and period utility depends on housing
and a composite consumption good. The direct utility contribution of homogeneous
housing is identical for renters and owners.6 The indirect contribution of housing is
via the net income that can be spent on the consumption good. We assume that
the household likes high expected net income, but dislikes risk, measured with the
variance of the net income. Based on period 0 information, the household decides
for the tenure mode that provides more expected utility.
The net income is the gross income Yt minus cost for housing (rent or mortgage
payments). Assuming that a house purchase requires no down-payment and that
the household stays until T in the dwelling, a renter’s net income is Yt − Rr,t for
t ∈ {1, . . . , T}; an owner’s net income is
Yt − iP for 1 ⩽ t < T
YT − (1 + i)P + Pr,T for t = T .
The owner thus locks housing cost in at iP for all but the last period.
Conditional on period 0 information, the expected net income is E[Yt]−R in all
periods and the same for renters and owners. The conditional variances, however,
are different: for a renter, they are
Var[Yt] + Var[Rr,t]− 2Cov[Yt, Rr,t]
6By assuming homogeneous dwellings, we ignore intra-region moves, such as trading up.
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and for an owner
Var[Yt] for 1 ⩽ t < T
Var[YT ] + Var[Pr,T ] + 2Cov[YT , Pr,T ] for t = T .
If income and rents are positively correlated, renting diversifies gross income risk,
but it depends on the magnitude of the correlation if renting provides a smoother
net income in periods t < T than owning. The owner household is insulated from
changing rents in all but the last period. Using (1), owner’s net income variance for
the last period T becomes
Var[YT ] + ±
2Var[Rr,T ] + 2±Cov[YT , Rr,T ]
with ± = Á(1 + i − Á)−1. If the rental process has no memory, Á = 0, then ± = 0
and ownership insulates from varying housing cost even in the last period. The
reasoning is simple: The house price in T is the present value of the expected future
rents; if these rents are not correlated with past rents, then the future price is not
uncertain. If rents have a memory, Á ∕= 0, then owners are exposed to part of the
accumulated rent risk in the last period. Ceteris paribus, it is therefore more likely
that a household will rent if the correlation between income and rents is high.
The model can be extended in three directions. First, we can allow households
to move to another region in 1 ⩽ t′ < T . Obviously, households do not have to
commit in period 0 to the tenure mode they will choose in t′. This implies that
their tenure choice today is unaffected by the choice they will make after they move
to the new region. Renter’s consumption risk in t′ < t ⩽ T is not influenced by
their current tenure mode. The same holds if they buy in the new region: This
result is driven by the assumption that no down-payment is required. Second, if
a down-payment is required, then the previous tenure mode has an impact on the
riskiness of the future tenure mode. This is most obvious for an owner who sells
the house in t′ and buys one in the other region. If rents and therefore prices in
the two regions are correlated, so will the resale price and the new down-payment.
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The sign and magnitude of inter-regional rent correlation determines if owner’s net
income becomes more or less risky.7 Third, we can include moving cost. Selling a
house comes with large transactions cost, which a household that has to be mobile
presumably wants to avoid.
The above exposition motivates three hypotheses: First, the specificity of human
capital should allow us to establish homogeneous profession groups, whose members
are exposed to the same systematic income risk. Second, if renting diversifies part
of the profession-specific income risk and smoothes net income, i.e., Var[Yt −Rt] <
Var[Yt], then a household should be more likely to rent. Third, ceteris paribus,
a household is more likely to rent the shorter the expected period of stay in the
dwelling. Although owning isolates the household from rental price risk for the time
of the stay, it also brings higher moving cost (because of the transactions cost of the
house sale). This may more then outweigh the lock-in effect.
The next section presents the data and explains how we construct necessary key
variables. Based on Hypothesis 1, we establish homogenous profession groups. We
then test if diversification potential (Hypothesis 2) and mobility requirements (Hy-
pothesis 3) impact on the tenure choice. To do so, we fit rental share regressions at
the profession-region level and binary response models at the household level. These
models include the key variables and control for other well-established determinants
of tenure choice such as potential credit constraints, differential tax treatment, and
household composition.
3 Data
This section presents the data and explains how we establish homogeneous profes-
sion groups, compute profession-specific income indices, regional rent indices, and
measure the mobility needs of profession groups.
7Under the special circumstances that the rental process has no memory, the owner household
is again perfectly insulated from all housing cost risk.
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Our main data are from the GSOEP for the years 1984 to 2004.8 The yearly panel
is a representative survey of economic conditions for German households and their
adult members. Further, we use information on regional house prices provided by
the Ring Deutscher Makler (RDM). All price and income variables are deflated with
the German CPI excluding housing services (from the Federal Statistical Office).9
We restrict the analysis to households living in one of the 30 West German
NUTS2 regions.10 We exclude households living in the East because the housing
market there is still adapting to a market-based system. We further focus on house-
holds whose head is between 18 and 65 years of age. Households who live in nursing
and retirement homes are excluded.
The main sample covers the years 1984 to 2004 and has 36625 observations
on 3476 individual household. This panel is unbalanced, because some households
leave and enter during the observation period. On average, 53% of the households
are tenants; the majority rents in the private sector, where rental prices are freely
negotiable between landlords and tenants.11 The duration of a rental contract is in
principle indefinite and landlords cannot give notice without further justification.
Households are thus well-protected from eviction risk. Landlords, on the other
8The data were made available to us by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study at the German
Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin.
9The RDM is an association of real estate professionals that publishes annual surveys on house
price levels in German cities. This information is not based on systematic statistics but inquiries
among members. Nevertheless it should provide a reasonable good picture of regional price levels.
To obtain regional house price levels, we aggregate the data on cities in a region by weighting
with city populations. Population figures are taken from the Gemeindeverzeichnis of the Federal
Statistical Office.
10The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics level 2 (NUTS2) defined by Eurostat cor-
respond to Government regions. A government region (Regierungsbezirk) is an administrative sub-
division of a certain federal state (Bundesland).
11According to Kirchner (2007), in 1993, 47.5% of all dwellings in West Germany were in the
private rental sector, 10.9% in the social rental sector and 41.6% are owner-occupied. Given that
we exclude some households, this is in line with our main sample.
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hand, have the right to adjust rental prices of existing contracts to market levels.12
The second column in Table 1 provides summary statistics on the socio-economic
characteristics of the households in the main sample; the third and second last
variables will be explained below.
[Table 1 about here.]
3.1 Profession grouping
The GSOEP reports both the industry (NACE Rev.1) and occupation (ISCO-88)
of all employed household members. The administratively defined industry and
occupation categories, however, do not necessarily reflect individual careers. As
people are likely to change jobs during their life, possibly moving to new industries
or occupations, measures of income risk based on these categories are likely to differ
from the systematic income risk individuals are truly exposed to.
Following Shiller and Schneider (1998), we use a cluster analysis to find profes-
sions whose members define stable groups. To build these groups our cluster algo-
rithm uses the transition matrix between 126 initially observed industry-occupation
categories defined by 14 main NACE industries and 9 major ISCO-88 occupations.
We estimate the transition probabilities from all household heads and spouses who
have been in the GSOEP for at least two years during the period 1984 to 2004. The
cluster algorithm groups the initial categories in such a way that individuals are
unlikely to move between clusters. Further details on the cluster analysis are given
in the Appendix.
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 2 presents the allocation of industries and occupations to professions, along
with broad categories we have assigned to the groups. We find 14 professions that are
12A thorough discussion of the institutional and legal setting in Germany can be found in Tomann
(1990) and Hubert (1998).
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characterized by high transition probabilities within and low transition probabilities
between groups (see Table 7 in the Appendix). The allocation of industries and
occupations to the 14 professions largely follows intuition. For instance, professions
in the health or financial sector comprise almost all occupations (Group 8 and Group
14). Craftsman and the like, on the other hand, form their own professional group
regardless of the industry (Group 9).
3.2 Key variables
To measure the diversification potential of renting, we compute annual income and
rent series for the 420 profession-region groups and the 30 regions as follows: First,
we run separate fixed effects panel regressions for the 14 professions and the 30
regions using the GSOEP data on income and apartment rents for the period 1984
to 2004. The estimated coefficients of the included time dummies give us constant-
quality index series. Second, we convert the index series into level series by using
the median profession income level in each region for the year 1995 and, respectively,
by using the median rent for each region in the same year.13 This gives us the rent
series. Third, the final income level series are computed as weighted averages of the
income received if employed and the benefit received if unemployed. Unemployment
replacement rates are provided by the OECD.14 The weights are based on the actual
unemployment rates of panel members within a given profession and year. The
Supplement provides further details.
We then compute the diversification measure for each profession and region as
the ratio of professions’ net income growth rate risk if renting to the risk if owning.
13The income movement of certain professions may also depend on region-specific factors. Thus,
one would ideally like to compute constant-quality income indices for each of the 420 profession-
region groups. Due to the lack of sufficient observations on the profession-region level in the GSOEP,
we are however not able to estimate precise enough income indices for each profession-region group.
14The OECD summary measure of replacement rates is defined as the average of the gross un-
employment benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family situations and three
durations of unemployment. For further details, see Martin (1996).
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Specifically, the real growth rate of net income if renting and the real growth rate










(Ypr,t −Rr)− (Ypr,t−1 −Rr)
(Ypr,t−1 −Rr)
. (3)
Ypr,t is the real income level for profession p in region r and year t. The real rent level
in region r and year t is Rr,t. Rr = 21
−1∑2004
t=1984Rr,t is the corresponding within-
region time average of rents. ΔY
(Rent)
pr,t measures the growth of real net income if the
household rents at the prevailing rental price. Correspondingly, ΔY
(Rent)
pr,t measures
the real net income growth of a household that has ‘looked-in the rent’ at the level
Rr by owner-occupation. (3) and (2) imply that, on average, owning and renting
have the same price, but their riskiness differs.
Two comments are in order: First, we focus on professional income and ignore
that households may have other sources of income, such as income from savings and
share investments. The GSOEP reports if a household owns other assets, but does
not specify the market value or the income from such assets. We thus cannot include
such income in Ypr,t. In the empirical analysis below, we control for households who
have no assets. Because a portfolio of assets facilitates income risk diversification, it
may act as substitute for renting, making renting more likely for households which
cannot use this substitute.15 Second, because important information on mortgage
financing and tax treatment is not reported in the GSOEP, we cannot compute
the user cost at the household level and hence at the profession group level. The
regional user cost Rr is then for the average household; in the empirical applications
we control for the tax treatment (by using labor income as regressor) and for changes
in interest and tax rates by using time dummies.
15No wealth can also prevent a household from obtaining a mortgage loan, because the household
cannot provide the downpayment. Banks will require a downpayment to share risk and it should
be the larger the larger the correlation between income and prices (and hence rents).
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Given the profession group income growth series, the diversification potential

































If ½pr = 1, the net income risk if renting is exactly the same as the riskiness of net
income risk with locked-in user cost. There is thus no extra diversification potential
of renting. If ½pr > 1, the co-movement between income and rent growth will allow
household in profession p to exploit diversification benefits. If ½pr < 1, negative
correlation between profession-specific income and regional rent growth does not
allow to diversify income risk by renting.
Note that (4) only varies across profession-region groups. In some households
another member earns professional income and this intra-household risk sharing
might impact on the tenure choice. In some of our empirical specifications, we
will consider such intra-household risk sharing by using the following variant of the
diversification potential measure: We replace the real income levels Ypr,t in equations








where the subscripts p(H) and p(S) denote the profession of the household head and
the spouse, respectively. In this case, the resulting series of household’s net income
growth rate, ΔY
(⋅)
ℎ,t , depends both on household head’s and spouse’s profession. The
household specific measure of the diversification potential of renting is calculated
along the lines of equation (4).
To measure household’s mobility, we estimate a parametric survival model of resi-
dence duration, using information on mobility histories of households in the GSOEP.
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From the fitted model we then predict the expected remaining residence duration of
each household, which is the expected length of stay after the household has spent
time ¿ in its current residence. The expected remaining residence duration is further
allowed to depend on the profession of the household head and the composition of
the household.
To be specific, let T ≥ 0 be a continuous random variable which represents
the duration of household tenure, that is the elapsed time since a household has last
moved. T is characterized by a (parametric) distribution function F (¿) = P (T ≤ ¿).






(u− ¿)f(u)du . (5)
Here, S(¿) = 1 − F (¿) denotes the survival function and f(¿) is the density. It is
obvious that the expected remaining duration at ¿ = 0 is the expected value of T .
Closed-form solutions for the integral on the right hand side of equation (5) exist for
a number of well-known life time distributions, see for example Lai and Xie (2006).
We specifically assume that residence spells have a lognormal distribution given
possibly time-varying household characteristics x(¿).16 This implies that ln(¿) has
a conditional normal distribution N(x(¿)¯, ¾2). Under the lognormal assumption









if ¿ = 0
1− Φ
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where Φ(⋅) denotes the standard normal distribution function. Note that ¹(¿) ini-
tially decreases and then monotonically increases with the elapsed time of stay.
Given estimates of the unknown parameters ¯ and ¾, we can easily impute the
expected remaining residence duration for each household by plugging the elapsed
time ¿ and household characteristics at that time in equation (6).
16We have discriminated between a number of parametric distributions, including the exponential,
lognormal, log-logistic, and Weibull distribution. The lognormal fitted the data best.
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In order to obtain estimates of ¯ and ¾, we run tobit-type regressions using
a flow sample of households’ residence durations extracted from the GSOEP. In
particular, we regress the log of households’ observed residence duration on a vector
of dummy variables representing household head’s profession and other household
characteristics. Among these are the age of the household head at the beginning
of the duration, household size, marital status, and gender. Detailed results of the
survival analysis are given in the Appendix.
Table 3 presents summary statistics of income and rental price growth for the
profession groups and the different regions over the whole sample and for the year
1995. Between 1984 and 2004 the average (across and within regions) standard
deviation of real rent growth was about 3.9 percent per year. For the same time
period the average (across and within professions) standard deviation of real income
growth rates was about 3.4 percent. The Table also gives summary statistics for the
year 1995. In this year, 56 percent of West German households rented their home.
On average they spent approximately 15 percent of their gross professional income
for rental payments. There is, however, substantial variation in rental shares, rent
levels, and income levels across the regions.
[Table 3 about here.]
The median of the diversification potential measure is 0.98. As evidenced by the
means of the measure for the bottom and top halves of its distribution, the income
smoothing potential from renting varies substantially across professions and regions.
Members of profession-region groups with a measure below its median value have on
average a 9.53 percent higher net income variance if renting. Households living in
profession-region groups with a measure above its median value, on the other hand,
reduces their net income variance on average by about 4.49 percent if renting their
home.
Households’ residential mobility is rather small. The average (across professions)
expected remaining residence duration was about 13.3 years in 1995. On the level of
16
profession-region groups, the average standard deviation of this variable is only 1.86
years. It must be noted, however, that the expected remaining residence duration not
only depends on a household’s profession, but also its composition. Thus averaging
across households of the same profession considerably reduces the variation of this
variable. Summary statistics of the two variables are also given at the bottom of
Table 1 for the three sub-samples.
4 Empirical implementation
This section explains how we use the two key variables to test if renting is more likely
the higher the diversification potential of renting (Hypothesis 2) and the shorter the
expected remaining residence duration (Hypothesis 3). We use several different
empirical specifications to examine the tenure choice of households both at the ag-
gregate profession group level and at the household level. The specifications are
explained in this section; Section 5 presents the empirical results.
4.1 Analysis at the profession group level
Let ypr,t denote the observed proportion of renter households within profession-
region group (pr) and year t. Here, p indexes the profession of the household head
and r the region the household lives in. We specify the corresponding population
quantity with the probit model
ypr,t = Φ(¯0 + ¯1½pr + ¯2¹(¿)pr,t + xpr,t±) + "pr,t , (7)
where Φ(⋅) denotes the standard normal distribution function, and the idiosyncratic
error "pr,t has mean zero. The profession-region specific diversification potential
if renting is captured by our time-constant measure ½pr. The expected remaining
residence duration, ¹(¿)pr,t, is the mean of this variable for all households belonging
to the group in year t. xpr,t is a vector collecting group means of socio-economic
17
controls. We further include a full set of profession dummies and time dummies in
xpr,t.
To estimate the coefficients in equation (7), we use the linear approximation to






= ¯0 + ¯1½pr + ¯2¹(¿)pr,t + xpr,t± + upr,t , (8)
where the error term upr,t has zero mean and has heteroscedastic variance of known
form.17 Thus, estimates of the coefficients can be obtained by standard (weighted)
least squares methods. In order to assess the magnitude of the effect of the explana-
tory variable on rental shares, we compute partial effects of the variables under
scrutiny. For instance, the estimated partial effect of ½pr on rental shares is given by
Á( ˆ̄0+ ˆ̄1½+ ˆ̄2¹(¿)+x±̂) ˆ̄1, where the explanatory variables are set to fixed values
of interest. We expected the partial effect of the diversification potential variable to
be positive (and thus ¯1 > 0) and the effect for the expected remaining duration to
be negative (and thus ¯2 < 0).
There are three econometric aspects associated with regression equation (8),
which need to be addressed. First, the heteroscedastic error term suggests that
weighted least squares regressions produce efficient parameter estimates. Households
within the same profession-region group, however, may share unobserved character-
istics, which in turn can lead to substantial reduction of heteroscedasticity (Dickens,
1990). Furthermore, pooling cross sections of profession-region groups over time
is likely to introduce serial correlated error terms. To avoid these potential mis-
specifications of the weighted least squares estimator, we run ordinary least squares
regressions. OLS delivers consistent, yet inefficient, parameter estimates.
Second, the regression given by equation (8) involves generated regressors, namely
the relative riskiness of renting ½pr and the mean residual time ¹(¿)pr,t. We thus
need to adjust standard errors accordingly. As we are primarily interested in the
17A detailed discussion of this approximation can be found in Amemiya (1981).
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partial effects of the explanatory variables on rental shares, we use bootstrap stan-
dard errors (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). We consider 200 replications from the
set of profession-region groups, and based on the resulting bootstrap sample esti-
mate partial effects. The standard deviations across the replications serve as the
bootstrap standard errors.
Third, the share of renters of different professions in different regions largely re-
flects the cumulative attainment of either tenure mode among group members. Given
the substantial transactions cost associated with adjustments to housing tenure, a
static analysis likely attributes historical choices to today’s conditions. To allow
for the dynamic nature of households’ tenure choices, we have to model the rent
or buy decision on the individual household level. This allows to control explicitly
for (unobserved) heterogeneity across households within the same profession-region
group.
4.2 Analysis at the household level
Households within profession-region groups share roughly the same exposure to rent
and income risk and the analysis above should be correct on average. It nonetheless
ignores lagged effects of past choices, as well as (unobserved) heterogeneity within
groups. In order to control for the dynamic nature of households’ housing choices
and (unobserved) heterogeneity, we therefore also need to examine the impact of our
key explanatory variables at the household level.
We start by estimating the relationship between a recent mover’s probability
to rent a home and our two key explanatory variables. Restricting our analysis
to recent movers has the advantage to investigate households who have made an
active tenure choice. The estimates of a recent mover’s probability to rent should
therefore avoid the impact of lagged effects on current decisions and more closely
reflect equilibrium conditions (Ihlanfeldt, 1981; Boehm et al., 1991). Recent movers
might be, however, different to the population regarding to unobserved character-
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istics. Possible consequences for our estimates due to selection bias are discussed
below.
We fit pooled probit models for recent movers
P (yℎ,t = 1∣½ℎ,t, ¹(¿)ℎ,t,xℎ,t) = Φ (¯0 + ¯1½ℎ,t + ¯2¹(¿)ℎ,t + ±xℎ,t) , (9)
where ℎ indexes the household and t the year of the most recent move. yℎ,t is an
indicator variable that takes the value one if the households rents its home and
zero otherwise. The diversification potential of renting is captured by ½ℎ,t, which
may depend on both the household head’s and the spouse’s profession. Household’s
expected remaining residence duration is ¹(¿)ℎ,t, where ¿ will be almost always equal
to zero because the household just moved.18 The vector xℎ,t collects socio-economic
controls, including a full set of profession and time dummies. Parameter estimates of
the probit model in equation (9) are obtained by the method of maximum likelihood.
There are two econometric issues associated with the probit model given by equation
(9), which need to be addressed.
First, the usual standard errors are invalid because i) unobserved shocks may
be serial correlated if the same household moves more than once during the period
under observation and ii) the use of generated regressors. We therefore use bootstrap
standard errors (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). Based on 200 bootstrap samples from
the set of households, we estimate partial effects. The standard deviations across
the replications serve as the bootstrap standard errors.
Second, using a sample of recent movers poses the problem of selection on un-
observable characteristics. Our estimates can be inconsistent if households’ moving
decisions are systematically related to unobserved factors that also affect tenure
choice (Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981). For instance, households with inher-
ent preferences to rent are presumably more likely to move despite a large value of
¹(¿)ℎ,t. This is because the substantially lower moving cost if renting allows them
18As the GSOEP does not always interview households in the same month, the residence duration
for some of these households is greater than zero.
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to adjust their housing consumption more easily in response to economic shocks.
Hence, the estimated coefficient ¯2 may be biased towards zero, and away from the
prediction of a negative effect.19
While the probit analysis of recent movers allows us to control for some of the
heterogeneity across households who share a profession and a region, there may be
unobserved factors, such as households’ risk tolerance, that influence tenure choice.
If these factors are independent of the observed explanatory variables, the estimated
partial effects can be interpreted as partial effects averaged over the distribution of
the unobserved factor.20 However, we can not consistently estimate (average) par-
tial effects, if the unobserved factor stochastically depends on observed explanatory
variables.
Due to the above mentioned possible problems related to the sample of recent
movers, we complement the analysis at the household level by examining the tenure
choices of the general population. This will further afford the ability to explicitly
control for unobserved heterogeneity.
When estimating the relationship between our key explanatory variables and
the probability to rent within the general population, we need to take the (usually)
sluggish adjustment of housing choices into account. Our approach to modeling the
dynamics of a household’s tenure choice is a dynamic random effects probit model
19Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) propose a Heckman-type correction for sample selection.
While their estimation procedure is formally identified if both the selection equation (modeling the
decision to move) and the outcome equation (modeling the decision to rent or buy) include the
same set of explanatory variables, the sole source of identification is the nonlinearity of the probit
model. A more convenient analysis hinges on appropriate exclusion restrictions. Given the joint
nature of moving and tenure choice, in our case these are hard to come by.
20To see this, let c be a household-specific unobserved effect. The model of interest is P (y =
1∣x, c) = Φ(x¯ + c). If the unobserved effect is assumed to be independent of the explanatory
variables and normal distributed c ∼ N(0, ¾2c ), the average partial effect of xj is given by ¯jcÁ(x¯c).
Here ¯jc denotes the population averaged parameter ¯jc
def
= ¯/(1+¾2c )
1/2, which can be consistently
estimated by probit of y on x (see for example Wooldridge (2002)).
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of the form
P (yℎ,t = 1∣yℎ,t−1, . . . , yℎ,0,½ℎ,¹(¿)ℎ,xℎ, cℎ) = Φ
(
¯0 + ¯1½ℎ,t + ¯2¹(¿)ℎ,t
+°yℎ,t−1 + xℎ,t± + cℎ
)
(10)
where ℎ indexes the household and t the year. yℎ,t is an indicator variable that takes
the value one if the households rents its home and zero otherwise. The potential state
dependence of a household’s current tenure choice is captured by the tenure mode in
the previous period yℎ,t−1. The household specific term cℎ stands for all unobserved
determinants of tenure choice that are time-invariant. Among these might be factors
such as household’s risk tolerance or general preferences for either tenure mode. The
vectors ½ℎ, ¹(¿)ℎ, and xℎ collect the entire path of the explanatory variables, which
are defined above. These variables are assumed to be strictly exogenous once cℎ is
controlled for.
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity in equation (10) leads to two economet-
ric problems (Heckman, 1981; Wooldridge, 2005). First, household specific factors,
such as the ones mentioned above, are likely to be correlated with observed char-
acteristics. The degree of risk aversion, for instance, may vary across demographic
characteristics.21
Second, the household specific factor causes serial dependence in the underlying
process of household’s tenure mode. Therefore, the first observed tenure mode is
stochastically dependent on cℎ. Presumably this is also true when we observe a
household at the beginning of its life. This is because the initial rent or buy decision
is most likely related to unobserved (risk) preferences as well.
Both of these issues can be addressed by parameterizing the household specific
effect conditional on the initial observation and the entire path of all non-redundant
21Barsky et al. (1997) find risk preferences related to demographics such as age, sex, and religion.
A recent study by Sahm (2007) shows that there are few sources of systematic change in risk
preference, like age, but substantial and large persistent differences in preferences across individuals
that can be explained by demographics.
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exogenous variables (Mundlak, 1978; Chamberlain, 1980; Wooldridge, 2005). Mod-
eling the distribution of cℎ leads to a conditional maximum likelihood approach
based on the joint distribution of tenure mode conditional on the initial observation
and the exogenous variables.22 We implement this approach by parameterizing the
distribution of the household specific effect as
cℎ = ®0 + ®1yℎ,0 + ®2½ℎ + ®3¹(¿)ℎ + xℎ®4 + aℎ , (11)
where yℎ,0 is the first observed tenure mode. The bars denote time averages of
the observations on the exogenous variables, for instance, ½ℎ = T
−1∑T
t=1 ½ℎ,t is the
average of the relative riskiness of renting for each household over the sample period.
aℎ is assumed to be independent of the exogenous variables and the initial tenure
mode, and distributed normal aℎ∣(yℎ,0,½ℎ,¹(¿)ℎ,xℎ) ∼ N(0, ¾2a).
Under these assumptions, the probability to rent (given (yℎ,t−1, . . . , yℎ,0,½ℎ,






The joint density, integrated against the N(0, ¾2a) distribution, has exactly the same
structure as the conditional likelihood of the random effects probit model. Param-
eter estimates are therefore obtained by standard conditional maximum likelihood
methods (see for example Wooldridge (2002)). However, it should be noted that
we can only include the averages of time-varying variables in equation (11). This is
because correlation of constant variables with cℎ and their impact on the probability
to rent can not be discriminated.
In order to assess the effect of our key explanatory variables on the probability
to rent, we compute average partial effects. Average partial effects evaluate the
22The usual way to account for the initial condition problem in dynamic nonlinear panel models
is to model the distribution of the initial observation conditional on the unobserved effect and the
exogenous variables, see for example Heckman (1981). The approach followed here serves the same
purpose, but leads to a much simpler estimator of the parameters and average partial effects. A
detailed discussion can be found in Wooldridge (2005).
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impact of a change in an explanatory variable on the outcome probability averaged
over the distribution of the unobserved effect. Wooldridge (2005) shows that the ex-













where the subscript a denotes the population averaged parameters, that is the orig-
inal parameter estimate multiplied by (1+ ¾2a)
−1/2. N is the number of all observa-
tions in all time periods. The explanatory variables ½, ¹(¿), x, and yt−1 are set to
fixed values of interest. We then obtain average partial effects by computing changes
or derivatives of expression (12) with respect to the variable under scrutiny.
Standard errors for the average partial effects are estimated from a panel (or
block) bootstrap. A block consists of the observations on an individual household
as a whole and covers at least 1 year and at most 20 years. For each block size
(measured in years), we resample the same number of households as there are in the
initial sample. This procedure preserves the total sample size as well as the pattern
of unbalancedness in our data. We consider 200 replications from the set of blocks
and based on the resulting bootstrap sample estimate average partial effects. The
standard deviations across the replications serve as our bootstrap standard errors.
There are two econometric issues associated with the dynamic correlated random
effects probit model given by equations (10) and (11), which need to be addressed.
First, identification of the impact of variables with limited variation within house-
holds on the probability to rent may be hard to establish. In particular, the relative
riskiness of renting is almost always time constant inducing severe multi-collinearity
between ½ℎ,t and ½ℎ. Hence, the average of this variable may turn out to be signifi-
cant, while the direct effect is insignificant. To examine this, we therefore estimate
two specifications of the correlated random effects model: i) a model with ½ℎ and
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ii) a model without it. In addition we report pooled probit estimates of equation
(10) that ignore any correlation between cℎ and the explanatory variables.
Second, the maximum likelihood estimator for the dynamic correlated random
effects model hinges on the strict exogeneity assumption of the explanatory vari-
ables. This assumption implies that future values of any explanatory variables can
not be related to household’s current tenure mode. However, in our case, misspecifi-
cation may arise from feedback effects of home-ownership to a household’s expected
remaining residence duration. We test for exogeneity of this variable, by including
future values of ¹(¿)ℎ,t into the model. If the current mean residual time is strictly
exogenous, we should find the future values to be insignificant (see for example
Wooldridge (2002)).
5 Results
5.1 Results at the profession group level
We have 3925 observations at the profession-group level. Summary statistics for the
variables at this level are given in the third column of Table 1. The statistics are
quite similar to the statistics at the household level, but can differ, because groups
size is ignored. Between 1984 and 2004, the average rental share across profession-
region cells was about 54%. There is, however, substantial variation in rental shares
which is largely attributable to cross sectional differences across professions and
regions.
Table 4 reports estimated partial effects obtained from ordinary least squares
regressions of equation (8). The partial effects are evaluated at sample averages of
mean profession-group characteristics (see column 3 of Table 1). The first specifica-
tion in Table 4 gives the estimation results from a regression that does not control
for differences in the composition of households across profession-region groups. The
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second specification adds the socio-economic control variables. Both specifications
include a full set of time dummies and profession dummies.
[Table 4 about here.]
As expected, the impact of the profession-region specific relative riskiness of renting,
½pr, on rental shares is positive. The share of renters of professions living in regions
with a higher diversification potential of renting are larger compared to regions
where renting does not allow to diversify some of the profession-specific income
risk. This effect is statistically significant in both specifications. To gauge the
magnitude of the diversification effect, we multiply the estimated partial effects by
a one standard deviation of ½pr. Such an increase in the diversification potential
implies that the average household’s net income variance if renting (holding the
profession-specific income variance constant) decreases by approximately 10 percent.
Using the estimate from the first specification, this risk reduction yields an increase
of rental shares by 1.4%. The magnitude of the effect, however, is smaller after
including the socio-economic controls. The same increase of ½pr is accompanied by
an increase in rental shares of 1.0% percentage points using the estimate from the
second specification.
The impact of mobility needs, ¹(¿)pr,t, has the expected negative sign in both
specifications. The share of renters is significantly smaller in profession-region groups
that are characterized by on average longer expected remaining residence durations.
This result, of course, not only reflects homeowners’ exposure to resale price risk,
but also the substantially lower transactions cost of changing residence if renting.
Increasing the expected duration by one year implies a decrease of rental shares
by 2.7%. Given the positive correlation between demographics, such as household
size (see Table 8 in the Appendix) and the expected remaining duration, it is not
surprising that the mobility effect is smaller in the second specification. Here the
same increase in ¹(¿)pr,t yields a decrease of rental shares by 1.6%.
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The signs of the estimated partial effects of the socio-economic characteristics
in Specification 2 of Table 4 are throughout reasonable. The average yearly profes-
sional income has a negative, yet statistically insignificant, effect on rental shares.
The ratio of regional house prices to yearly household income and the proportions
of households with no financial assets, on the other hand, have a positive and sig-
nificant effect on rental shares. These effects are consistent with the interpretation
as presence of credit constraints that prevent households from buying a home.
Demographic characteristics, like household size, number of children, and marital
status, have the expected negative impact on the proportion of renters. Notably the
proportion of households with a foreign head increases rental shares. These effects
are statistically significant at the usual levels. The impact of household head’s gender
and age on rental shares, on the other hand, are indistinguishable from zero. While
economic theory does not suggest any particular influence of the former variable,
identification of the latter is aggravated by the rather small variation of household
head’s average age across profession-region groups.
Surprisingly, the estimated effect of household head’s education is positive. If
formal education is a proxy for household’s (future) earning potential, we rather ex-
pect the propensity to rent to decline with this variable. While this line of reasoning
especially holds at the beginning of household (adult) lives (Gyourko and Linneman,
1997), the static nature of the rental share regressions may distort our estimation
results. Below we find the expected negative impact of household head’s education
on the probability to rent for individual households.
We conclude that the results in Table 4 provide evidence for the proposed effect of
income risk and mobility needs of different professions on households’ tenure choice.
The aggregate level analysis, however, has its limitations. First, households within
profession-region groups are heterogenous with regard to observed and unobserved
characteristics that may influence tenure mode choice. Second, the rental share
regressions are static in nature and ignore the dynamic aspect of the tenure choice.
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We cope with these limitations next by using data at the household level.
5.2 Results at the household level
We first present results for recent movers. Recent movers are households who have
moved into their current residence between two survey waves. Since the GSOEP
does not provide information on a change of residence in 1984, we use observation
from 1985 to 2004. Summary statistics for the recent mover sample are provided
in the last column of Table 1. We observe 5820 recent movers comprising, due
to multiple moves, 3364 individual households. Recent movers are different from
the relevant general population as represented in the second column. The socio-
economic characteristics suggest that recent movers are in the early stage of their
life-cycle. Compared to the average household in the main sample, recent movers
earn less income and have accumulated less assets. They are on average also younger,
of smaller size, and comprise less families (with less children). Moreover, a recent
mover is also more likely to be renter.
Table 5 reports estimated partial effects from the pooled probit model given
in equation (9). The partial effects are evaluated at sample averages of household
characteristics (see the last column of Table 1). The first specification in Table 5
present estimation results when only the two key explanatory variables and time and
profession dummies are included. The socio-economic control variables are added in
the second specification.
[Table 5 about here.]
The estimated partial effect of the household-specific diversification potential of rent-
ing, ½pr,t, is again positive for both specifications and statistically significant. Thus,
the probability to rent of the average recent mover decreases with the household’s
net income risk if renting. Notably, the magnitude of the diversification potential
effect is of a similar magnitude as in the rental share regressions. Multiplying the
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estimated partial effect with a one standard deviation increase of ½pr,t (implying a
larger diversification potential if renting) by roughly 10% yields an increase in the
probability to rent by about 1.2%.
The impact of household’s expected remaining residence duration, ¹(¿)ℎ,t, on the
probability to rent is negative and statistically significant. Considering the estimated
partial effect in the first specification, an increase of the expected duration by one
year yields a decrease of the probability to rent by 2.8%. While the magnitude of this
effect is of similar size compared to the results from the rental share regressions, the
estimated mobility effect becomes much smaller after controlling for the observed
heterogeneity across households. In the second specification, the same increase of
¹(¿)ℎ,t decreases the probability to rent by only 0.6%. Given the discussion in the
previous section, this result is most likely attributable to the selection of the sample
on the basis of active moving decisions.
The estimated partial effects of the socio-economic control variables in the second
specification in Table 5 are reasonable and of similar magnitude as at the aggregate
level (see Table 4). As in all regressions before, the probability to rent increases
significantly with the ratio of average house prices to household income, as well as
the absence of financial asset holdings. Unlike to the rental share regressions, the
influence of yearly income is now statistically significant. As expected, the greater
sample variation in this variable allows us to identify a negative impact of this
variable on the probability to rent. Given that the ‘no assets’ and the ‘price to
income’ variables already control for credit constraints, the income variable controls
for the differential tax treatment. Owner’s imputed rents are not taxed, which is the
more valuable the higher the marginal tax rate and thus the higher owner’s income.
The demographic control variables, like household size, marital status, number
of children, and foreign household heads, have a statistically significant influence on
the probability to rent. Compared to their effect in the rental share regressions,
the magnitude of these effects are only slightly smaller. Notably, the age and the
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education of household head have the expected negative influence on household’s
probability to rent. It is, however, not clear if the significant age effect mirrors true
life cycle effects like wealth accumulation. This is because there may be indirect age
effects due to correlation between this variable and unobserved factors, such as risk
tolerance.
The last specifications are fitted to all observations in our main sample as sum-
marized in 1. Table 6 reports average partial effects (APE) from pooled probit
and correlated random effects estimates of equation (10). In the case of the pooled
probit model, we ignore any correlation between the explanatory variables and the
unobserved effect. We interpret the estimated coefficients as population averaged
parameters, from which we directly compute the APEs (see for example Wooldridge
(2002)). The correlated random effects model parameterizes the unobserved effect
as a function of the within-household averages of the time-varying explanatory vari-
ables and a vector of dummy variables to represent the first observed tenure mode.
We compute the APEs based on expression (12). Both the APEs of the pooled probit
and correlated random effects model are evaluated at sample averages of household
characteristics (see the second column of Table 1).
In the first specification of the pooled probit model, we only include our two
key explanatory variables, the initial and lagged tenure mode, time dummies, and
profession dummies.23 In the second pooled probit specification, the socio-economic
control variables are added. The remaining results are for four different specifications
of the correlated random effects model: The first two, specifications 3 and 4 in Table
6, allows for correlation between the time-average of the relative riskiness of renting,
½ℎ, and the unobserved effect. The last two leave ½ℎ out. In the reported results, we
further drop the time-averages of gender and nationality of household heads. These
variables are almost always time-constant. In order to allow panel attrition to be
correlated with the unobserved effect, we also include a full set of dummy variables
23The initial tenure mode, yℎ,0, is included, because yℎ,0 must be correlated with the unobserved
factor cℎ if present.
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representing the years a household is not observed.
[Table 6 about here.]
In all four specifications of the correlated random effects model the estimated vari-





a + 1) is zero is always rejected.
24 Furthermore, controlling for
unobserved effects improves the fit of the model, as evidenced by the change in the
log likelihood and Pseudo R2. Notably there is still much unobserved heterogeneity
even after explicitly considering socio-economic differences across households. With-
out controls, aℎ accounts for approximately 53% of the unexplained error variance
(specifications 3 and 5), compared to 48% after including demographics (Specifi-
cations 4 and 6). There is thus strong evidence that unobserved factors influence
households’ tenure choices.
Before we turn to the estimated effects of our key explanatory variables, it is of
interest to discuss how past tenure choices influence current choices. The impact
of the lagged tenure mode, yℎ,t−1, is positive and significant in all specifications.
Therefore, occupancy of either tenure mode highly affects current housing choices.
It is striking that, comparing the correlated random effects estimates to the pooled
probit estimates, the magnitude of the APEs are substantially smaller. This result
suggests that the coefficient on yℎ,t−1 in the pooled probit estimates has picked up
the effect of unobserved household characteristics. However, even after controlling
for unobserved effects, the degree of state dependence is substantial. Changing the
tenure mode from owner to renter increases a household’s probability to rent it’s
home in the following year by approximately 58% in columns three through six.
Even after controlling for the strong state dependence of households’ tenure
choices (and unobserved heterogeneity) the estimated effect of the household specific
24Since the variance of the idiosyncratic error in the underlying latent variable model is unity, µ
measures the relative importance of ¾2a. If µ equals zero the unobserved effect is unimportant and
random effects estimates are not different from pooled probit estimates.
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diversification potential, ½ℎ,t, has a positive sign. The probability to rather rent then
buy a home increases with the diversification potential measure in all specifications.
The effect, however, is indistinguishable from zero in both correlated random effects
specifications A (Specification 3 and 4). This result can be explained by the severe
collinearity between ½ℎ,t and its within household time average ½ℎ,t. As expected,
identification of the true effect of ½ℎ,t on the probability to rent and its correlation
with the unobserved effect is aggravated, because ½ℎ,t only varies over time when
household members change their profession or the household moves to a new region.
Given that this variable is not correlated with unobserved household character-
istics, we can largely confirm the results from the rental share regressions and probit
estimates for recent movers.25 Whereas the estimated APE of ½ℎ,t on the probability
to rent is only weakly significant (with a p-value of 0.125) in Specification 5, the
income risk effect is statistically significant after controlling for socio-economic dif-
ferences across households. Multiplying the estimated APE of 0.121 in Specification
6 with a one standard deviation increase of ½ℎ,t, which implies an increase of the
diversification potential if renting by roughly 10%, increases the probability to rent
by 1.2%.
Turning to the impact of mobility needs, we find that the estimated APEs of
households’ expected remaining residence duration, ¹(¿)ℎ,t, have the expected neg-
ative sign in all six specifications. The mobility effect is throughout statistically
significant. In our preferred model specification, the correlated random effects spec-
ification (B) with socio-economic controls (Specification 6), a one year increase in
¹(¿)ℎ,t decreases the probability to rent by about 1.4%. Notably, the magnitude of
the estimated APEs only slightly vary across estimation methods and model speci-
fications. Moreover, the size of the mobility effect is throughout comparable to the
magnitude of partial effects which we have found in the rental share regressions (see
25While Guiso and Paiella (2008) show that the presence of uninsurable income risk can influence




The estimated impact of the socio-economic controls on the probability to rent
have reasonable directions in the specifications where they are included. After allow-
ing for correlation between these variables and the unobserved effect, however, the
APEs of most controls are indistinguishable from zero. Exceptions are income, the
ratio of average house prices to household income, household size, and foreign house-
hold heads, which all have the expected influence on the probability to rent. The
insignificant APEs are likely to be due to two reasons: First, some of the variables,
such as age, affect tenure choice indirectly through their correlation with unobserved
factors. Second, in some cases the rather time-constant nature of variables, like ed-
ucation and marital status, severely aggravates identification.
5.3 Robustness checks
We checked the sensitivity of our results by fitting the models to different sub-
samples and by using specification tests.
First, we investigated whether the inclusion of potentially credit constrained
households distort the estimated effects of our key explanatory variables. House-
holds who are credit constraint, in the sense that their lifetime resources are suf-
ficient to buy a home, but current wealth does not suffice the down-payment re-
quirement to obtain bank financing, are renters by default. Under the presumption
that these households live in subsidized social housing dwellings, we re-estimated
the three empirical models using only households operating in the private sector.
The main results in Tables 4, 5, and 6 remained unchanged. The GSOEP does not
provide information if initially subsidized social rental dwellings have been turned
into privately rented dwellings during the course of time, so the above strategy may
exclude too many households.26 Therefore, we also conducted the analysis restricted
26Most social rental dwellings where constructed using subsidized loans, which bind landlords
to accept eligible households and also curtails the rent they can command. After 30 years or so,
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to households who report at least some resources that may be utilized as a down-
payment for an owner-occupied home. In particular, we excluded households with
no financial asset holdings (besides saving accounts). Again the main results in the
tables remained qualitatively unchanged.
Second, we restricted the analysis to households whose head is of German origin.
As households with foreign heads might have quite different planning horizons, their
inclusion could also distort our results. In particular, foreign households may expect
to re-emigrate to the country of their origin after retirement, and thus do not invest
in owner-occupied housing regardless of the risk aspects under consideration. The
main results in the tables remained qualitatively unchanged.
Third, we tested for the endogeneity of the explanatory variables in the dynamic
correlated random effects model as explained above. We found that the coefficient
on the lead of the mean residual time is not distinguishable from zero, which provides
justification for the strict exogeneity assumption we make in our analysis.
6 Conclusion
In this study we have empirically investigated the impact of professional career de-
cisions and their associated income risk and mobility needs on the tenure choice of
German households. Economic theory suggests that members of professions whose
income comoves strongly with regional rental prices should prefer to rent their home.
Then periods of declining income are accompanied by decreasing rents, allowing to
smooth consumption of non-housing goods. Given homeowners exposure to the re-
sale price risk of their house and the substantially larger transactions cost of changing
residence, members of professions requiring high mobility should also prefer to rent.
We find empirical support for these two impacts of professional career decisions
on households’ tenure choice. We find for profession-region groupings that group’s
however, the commitment is no longer binding and dwellings can be rented at market prices.
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rental share is higher if renting smoothes net income and if the expected residence
duration of group members is short. Using data on both recent movers and the
general population, we confirm these key results at the household level. Even after
controlling for the substantial state dependence of households’ tenure choices and
unobserved heterogeneity, we find that income risk and mobility needs affect the
propensity to rent as expected.
The empirical findings of our study are particulary interesting with respect to
households’ risk management opportunities. Starting with Shiller’s (1993) initial
contribution, a vast amount of literature has focussed on new financial instruments
that allow homeowners to insure against house price fluctuations as part of an in-
tegrated risk management approach. However, a well-functioning private rental
market works in the same direction and can provide risk diversification benefits to
households. Renting allows households to separate the use component from the in-
vestment component and thus provides valuable flexibility. The empirical results of
our study indicate that households exploit these benefits if present.
Our analysis focussed only on the residential user side. Investors, i.e., landlords,
were treated as absent. However, for many investors investment in rental apartments
might be a welcome extension of the investable asset universe. It might be worth-
while to study the welfare contribution of a well-functioning private rental market in
a general equilibrium context. While the exact welfare contribution is by no means
obvious, it is natural to expect that preferential treatment of one tenure mode over




Our cluster analysis uses the observed transitions between industry-occupation cat-
egories in the GSOEP to delineate profession groups. Let i denote a occupation-
industry group and pij the probability of a person to belong to this group conditional
on being a member of group j in the previous period. These initial transition prob-






where Ni,t∣j,t−1 is the number of persons employed in group i in period t conditional
on being employed in group j in period t − 1. Ni,t denotes the total number of
persons employed in group i in period t.
We specifically use observations on 122,978 employed individuals (household
heads and spouses) who live in West-Germany and 18-65 years of age and have
been in the GSOEP for at least two years to estimate the elements of the initial
transition matrix. The initial occupation-industry groups are assigned to each indi-
vidual according to the ISCO-88 1-digit and the NACE Rev.1 1-digit classification
of occupations and industries, respectively. ISCO-88 covers 9 main occupations.
NACE covers 17 main industries from which three industries are not observed. Fur-
thermore, two initial occupation-industry groups are not observed (see Table 2).
The transition matrix between these 124 industry-occupation groups is the data
matrix from which we build the profession groups. In particular, we use a K-Medians
cluster algorithm that starts from a given partition of the initial groups and proceeds
by exchanging elements between groups until a certain score is optimized (see e.g.
Rencher, 2002). Here, we experimented with a number of initial profession groups
that we have found by a first step agglomerative (weighted-average linkage) cluster
algorithm. Both, dendograms from this first step analysis and a careful inspection of
the allocation of industries and occupations to professions let us choose 14 profession
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groups.
[Table 7 about here.]
Table 7 reports the estimated transition probabilities between these 14 profes-
sion groups. The cluster analysis was quite successful in assigning industry and
occupation categories to stable professions. The diagonal elements of the matrix,
that is the transition probabilities within professions, are almost always above 80
percent. The lowest within transition probability is 79 percent, the highest within
transition probability is 94 percent. The off-diagonal elements, that is the transition
probabilities between professions is almost always lower than 3 percent. The lowest
between transition probability is virtually 0 percent, the highest between transition
probability is about 10 percent.
A.2 Survival Analysis
We define ¿i to be the duration of the i-th households’ residence spell, that is the
elapsed duration since the household has moved into it’s current residence. A spell
is completed if the household moves to a new residence or dissolves. Here dissolving
household are the result of emigration, death, or disbandment for other reasons.
Otherwise spells are defined to be right-censored.
In order to estimate the unknown parameters in equation (6), we employ the
following linear regression model for censored data:
ln (¿i) = x(¿)i¯ + "i , (14)
where the vector x(¿)i collects (possibly) time-varying household characteristics at
time ¿ and the error term is standard normal distributed "i ∼ N(0, ¾2). In our
preferred model specification we include age, age squared of the household head
at the beginning of the spell and dummy variables for three different household
sizes, dual-earner households, household heads’ marital status, and household heads’
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gender in x(¿)i. To capture profession specific impacts on households’ mobility, we
further include dummy variables representing the household head’s profession. The
reference category are household heads who are not in the labor force. We further
include time dummies for the beginning of the residence spells in x(¿)i.
We fit equation (14) by the method of maximum-likelihood using a flow sample
of households’ residence spells (see for example Lancaster (1990)). This sample is
extracted from the GSOEP for the period 1985 to 2003. Here, a new observation on
a residence spell enters our sample when a household moves to a new residence or is
newly formed in the year under consideration. The 1984 and 2004 survey waves are
excluded for the following reasons. First, the GSOEP does not identify a households
moving status in 1984. Second, Observations in 2004 are right-censored by definition.
Note that we though allow for multiple spells of the same household. In total we
observe 8052 residence spells. Of these 4438 are completed. The remaining spells
are right-censored.
[Table 8 about here.]
Table 8 reports maximum likelihood estimates of equation (14). The coefficients
on the demographic control variables are statistically significant and have reason-
able signs. The age of household heads, for instance, has a hump-shaped profile:
The expected length of residence spells increases up to an age of 35 years and sub-
sequently decreases. The coefficients on the profession dummies, on the other, are
only partly significant. A Wald test of the joint significance, however, rejects the
null hypotheses that the coefficients are jointly zero. Thus, providing evidence that
the profession of the household head affects residential mobility.
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Table 1: Summary statistics by household sample. Mean of variables. Standard
deviations of the variables are in square brackets. Yearly labor income is income of household
head in real (2000) Euros, deflated by the German CPI excluding housing services. Price-
income ratio is the ratio of the mean price of a single-family dwelling of average quality and
yearly household income. Data for regional house prices are provided by the Ring Deutscher
Makler (RDM). Relative riskiness of renting is calculated according to equation (4). In
column 2 and column 2 this variable is allowed to depend on both the household head’s and
spouse’s profession. Mean residual time is calculated according to equation (6).
Unbalanced Profession-region Recent movers
household panel cells
1984–2004 1984–2004 1985–2004
Renter [0.531] [0.536] [0.782]
[0.174]
Age [47.867] [41.474] [34.492]
[9.943] [4.946] [10.415]
Education [11.285] [11.892] [11.676]
[2.687] [1.935] [2.766]
Household Size [3.035] [2.816] [2.367]
[1.409] [0.648] [1.259]
Yearly labor income (0000) [26.015] [29.120] [22.811]
[19.951] [9.541] [17.265]
House price/Hh. income [11.508] [9.966] [14.375]
[9.055] [4.218] [10.773]
Female 0.161 0.285 0.384
[0.264]
Kids 0.569 0.500 0.339
[0.234]
Married 0.771 0.654 0.451
[0.227]
No assets 0.097 0.079 0.143
[0.129]
Foreigner 0.157 0.149 0.132
[0.234]
Relative riskiness [0.976] [0.984] [0.978]
[0.102] [0.104] [0.101]
Mean residual time [16.589] [13.791] [9.787]
[4.602] [2.609] [4.893]
Number of observation 36625 3925 5820
43
Table 2: Allocation of industries and occupations to profession groups. Table
presents 14 profession clusters. Occupation categories are the 9 main occupations according
to ISCO-88 classification, which comprises the following occupations: ISCO 1 Legislators,
senior officials and managers, ISCO 2 Professionals, ISCO 3 Technicians and associate pro-
fessionals, ISCO 4 Clerks, ISCO 5 Service workers and shop and market sales workers, ISCO
6 Skilled agricultural and fishery worker, ISCO 7 Craft and related trades workers, ISCO
8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers, ISCO 9 Elementary occupations. Industry
categories are the 14 main sectors according to NACE, Rev. 1.1 classification, which com-
prises the following sectors: NACE A Agriculture, hunting and forestry, NACE B Fishing,
NACE C Mining and quarrying, NACE D Manufacturing, NACE E Electricity, gas and
water supply, NACE F Construction, NACE G Wholesale and retail trade, NACE H Ho-
tels and restaurants, NACE I Transport, storage and communication, NACE J Financial
intermediation, NACE K Real estate, renting and business activities, NACE L Public ad-
ministration and defence, NACE M Education, NACE N Health and social work, NACE O
Other community, social and personal service activities, NACE P Activities of households,
NACE Q Extra-territorial organizations and bodies.
Profession group (Occupation/Sector)
1: Management/Production, trade 08: All occupations/Health, social work
2: Management/Public, private 09: Manual/Production, service
3: Management/Public 10: Elementary/Public, private
4: All occupations/Natural resources 11: Service work/Service
5: All occupations/Energy, utilities 12: Service work/Production
6: All occupations/Hotel,restaurants 13: All occupations/Agricultural
7: All occupations/Transport, communication 14: All occupations/Financial
ISCO-88
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
NACE A 13 2 2 2 13 13 9 13 13
NACE C 4 4 4 4 12 - 4 4 4
NACE D 1 1 1 1 12 13 9 9 9
NACE E 5 5 5 5 12 - 5 5 5
NACE F 1 2 1 1 12 13 9 9 9
NACE G 1 1 1 1 12 13 9 9 10
NACE H 6 6 6 6 6 6 9 9 6
NACE I 7 7 7 7 7 13 7 7 7
NACE J 14 14 14 14 11 14 14 14 10
NACE K 1 3 1 1 11 13 9 10 10
NACE L 2 2 2 2 11 13 9 10 10
NACE M 3 3 3 3 11 13 9 10 10
NACE N 8 3 8 8 8 8 9 8 10
NACE O 3 3 3 3 11 13 9 9 10
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Table 3: Summary statistics of key variables. Key variables are at profession and
NUTS2 level. Mean of variables. Standard deviations are in square brackets. Rent growth
and income growth, and the standard deviations of rent and income growth are computed
from constant-quality rent and income indices. Relative riskiness of renting, ½pr, is calculated
according to equation (4). Mean residual time is calculated according to equation (6).
Median rent level, median income level, and the proportion of renters are estimated from
GSOEP wave 1995. All euro values are in real (2000) euros, deflated by the German CPI
excluding housing services.
Profession groups Regions
1984–2004 1995 1984–2004 1995
Real income growth [0.012]
[0.036]
S.d. of real income growth [0.034]
[0.013]
Median of ½pr [0.988]
[0.034]
S.d. of ½pr [0.086]
[0.037]
Mean of ½pr if below median [0.913]
[0.032]
Mean of ½pr if above median [1.047]
[0.024]
Real rent growth [0.014]
[0.041]
S.d. of real rent growth [0.039]
[0.017]
Mean residual time [13.268]
[1.862]
Real median income [2223.42]
[245.80]
Real median rent [331.70]
[39.212]
Proportion of renters [0.564]
[0.125]
Number of observations 280 14 600 30
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Table 4: Partial effects from OLS regression of rental shares. Pooled cross-section
for the period from 1984 to 2004. Table reports partial effects from ordinary least squares
regression of equation (8). Partial effects are calculated at sample means of explanatory
variables. Constant, profession dummies, and time dummies are not reported. Bootstrap
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Number of replications is 200. R̄2 is the adjusted
R2. *** significant at 1%-level ** significant at 5%-level * significant at 10%-level.
Dependent variable: Profession-region rental share
Specification 1 Specification 2
½pr 0.138
∗∗∗ [0.026] 0.093∗∗∗ [0.023]
¹(¿)pr,t -0.027
∗∗∗ [0.001] -0.016∗∗∗ [0.003]
Income -0.001 [0.000]
No assets 0.055∗∗ [0.025]











Table 5: Partial effects from probit model for recent movers. Pooled cross-section
for the period from 1985 to 2004. Table reports partial effects from probit estimates of equa-
tion (9). Partial effects are calculated at sample means of explanatory variables. Constant,
profession-dummies, and time-dummies are not reported. Bootstrap standard standard are
reported in parenthesis. Number of replications is 200. The pseudo R2 is computed as
1 − ℒur/ℒo, where ℒur is the log likelihood value of the unrestricted model and ℒo the
log likelihood value of a constant only model. *** significant at 1%-level ** significant at
5%-level * significant at 10%-level.
Binary dependent variable: Household is renter
Specification 1 Specification 2
½pr 0.131
∗∗ [0.056] 0.117∗∗ [0.053]
¹(¿)pr,t -0.028
∗∗∗ [0.001] -0.006∗∗ [0.003]
Income -0.001∗∗∗ [0.000]
No assets 0.095∗∗∗ [0.014]









Log likelihood -2635.34 -2397.53






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Lognormal regression of residence spells. Table reports maximum likelihood
estimates of equation (14). Constant and time dummies are not reported. Reported standard
errors in parenthesis are robust to serial correlated errors. Akaike information criterion (AIC)
is computed as −2 ⋅ ℒ + 2 ⋅ k. ℒ is the value of the log likelihood and k = 43 the model
degrees of freedom. Wald statistic is for the null hypothesis that reported coefficients on
profession dummies are jointly zero. P-Value is for Â2(14) distribution.




Household size=2 0.203∗∗∗ [0.037]
Household size=3 0.165∗∗∗ [0.047]



















No of observations 38343 No of Spells 8052
Log likelihood -8513.23 AIC 17112.46
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